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Abstract Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on norma-
tive properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these
analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution
concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people’s impartial normative
evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims
environment. We measure people’s judgments on the normative attractiveness of
solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a
bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solu-
tion is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements
are closest to the ‘constrained equal-award’ solution.
1 Introduction
In this paper we empirically investigate bargaining problems with claims. These are
an important class of more general rationing problems where agents have acquired
S. Gächter
CESifo, Munich, Germany
S. Gächter · A. Riedl
IZA, Bonn, Germany
S. Gächter
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park,
Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
E-mail: Simon.Gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk
A. Riedl (B)
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration,
University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
E-mail: a.riedl@algec.unimaas.nl
572 S. Gächter, A. Riedl
claims on resources that cannot all be satisfied. As pointed out by Moulin (2000)
rationing problems are among the oldest distribution problems tackled with formal
models of distributive justice and encompass a variety of specific contexts. For
instance, problems of taxation (e.g., Young 1988) and the problem how to share
the cost of a public good (e.g., Moulin 1987) can be interpreted in this way. A
prominent interpretation – and one that inspired our paper – is as a (bargaining
with) claims problem or bankruptcy problem (e.g., O’Neill 1982; Aumann and
Maschler 1985).1
The prominence and practical relevance of the problem led to a stream of
theoretical contributions about the right way to solve the problem. For a recent
survey of this literature we refer the reader to Thomson (2003). The game theoretic
approach formulates the claims problem as a game and relates the solutions to
prominent solution concepts of games without claims (see, for instance, O’Neill
1982; Aumann and Maschler 1985; Curiel et al. 1987; Chun and Thomson 1992;
Dagan and Volij 1993). The axiomatic approach tries to identify rules satisfying a
set of intuitively reasonable axioms that can be applied to such claims problems
(see among others, Dagan 1996; Moulin 2000; Chun et al. 2001; Herrero and Villar
2001).2
The axiomatic approach has derived three prominent rules to solve bankruptcy
problems that we will investigate empirically in this paper. These rules, which we
describe in detail in the next section are (1) the proportional rule, according to
which resources are allocated among claimants in the proportion of their claims;
(2) the constrained equal-losses rule, which distributes the loss equally among
claimants; and (3) the constrained equal-awards rule, which allocates the resource
equally among the claimants provided no one receives more than his or her claims.
Without doubt, the theoretical literature has improved our understanding of the
axiomatic and game theoretic underpinnings of various normative rules. Yet, in
practice, many people who have to deal with claims problems will use arguments
on the perceived attractiveness of the rules. Hence, a normative solution should
not only be theoretically appealing but also prove to be tenable and sustainable
in the sense that all parties involved in the claims problem can accept it. This is
even more so if several different theoretical concepts correspond to different attrac-
tive solutions of games or satisfy different attractive sets of axioms. Therefore, as
a complementary approach it is useful to have positive evidence on solutions to
claims problems.
In this paper we assess the three rules to claims problems empirically. There are
two dimensions to this empirical assessment. The first dimension is the moral or
normative intuition people have on what they think a fair solution is. If we devise
rules they should hold for a broad class of problems and have to be normatively
acceptable for many people who are potentially subjected to the rule. The second
dimension is actual behavior that may or may not be influenced by justice argu-
ments. If we want to understand how people will behave if they negotiate on their
1 Chun and Thomson (1992) distinguish a claims problem from a bankruptcy problem as the
former is the non-transferable utility variant of the latter. For convenience we do not distinguish
between the two in this paper.
2 Most of the literature applies cooperative game theory. For an important exception using a
non-cooperative approach, see Dagan et al. (1997).
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behalf in a bankruptcy problem we need to know how the claims influence the
bargaining outcome. This paper provides empirical evidence on both dimensions.
Different tools are needed for appropriately covering both dimensions. Assess-
ing normative views requires impartiality. In contrast, when people actually nego-
tiate over the division of a surplus that they will enjoy after an agreement has been
reached, people are certainly not impartial. To assess impartial normative views
we employ a vignette technique. Vignettes describe the bargaining with claims
problem and then the respondents are asked to make a judgment about a fair divi-
sion of the available pie. Our second tool is laboratory experiments where subjects
actually negotiate in a bargaining with claims environment.
Vignettes have the advantage that they measure the unbiased responses of
impartial participants. Exactly because the question is hypothetical, responses can-
not be confounded by self-interest, but reflect the normative judgments of the
respondents. This is why vignettes are very popular in empirical research on eth-
ical rules of theories of justice (e.g., Yaari and Bar-Hillel 1984; Kahneman et al.
1986; Schokkaert and Overlaet 1989; Schokkaert and Capeau 1991; Gaertner et al.
2001; Gaertner and Jungeilges 2002; see Konow (2002) for an extensive survey).
Our second instrument measures people’s actual behavioral responses in a lab-
oratory bargaining experiment, where financially motivated subjects have to nego-
tiate in a free-form bargaining with claims environment and where the agreements
determine the bargainers’ compensation. Thus we can examine which normative
solution concept corresponds best to the agreements in real, not hypothetical, nego-
tiations. Previous experiments in the area of fairness and justice research that is
related to our experiments comprise Frohlich et al. (1987), Frohlich and Oppen-
heimer (1990), Gaertner and Klemisch-Ahlert (1992), Klemisch-Ahlert (1996) and
Beckman et al. (2002). In the experiment we may observe a confluence of motiva-
tions, like envy, egoism and toughness. The comparison of surveys and experiments
will allow us to assess the difference of moral judgments and actual behavior.
Our research design also varies the claims. We look at two different claims
points because theoretically the normative attractiveness of bankruptcy rules is
independent of the specific claims. Empirically, however, different distributions of
claims may make particular solutions more or less attractive. One claims point is
very asymmetric in that one claimant has a much higher claim than the other one.
The second claims point is more balanced. This offers us the possibility to observe
if and how the asymmetry of the claims point influences the normative judgments
and actual behavior.
In our research design the normative solutions make different point predictions
about how the resource should be allocated. Our empirical strategy is to observe
the normative judgments in the vignette study and the negotiated agreements in
the experiment and then to investigate which of the normative rules comes closest
to the observed outcome. In the vignettes we find that for both claims levels the
subjects’ answers come closest to the proportional rule. By contrast, in the exper-
iments, the agreements are for both claims points close to the solutions proposed
by the ‘constraint equal-awards’ rule and the equal split.
In examining the negotiated agreements we also consider an area-based descrip-
tive bargaining theory as an alternative to the point predictions of the bankruptcy
rules. We find that a solution that adjusts the Negotiation Agreement Area The-
ory developed by Uhlich (1990) by the claims points does very well in predicting
behavior for claims points that are not ‘too asymmetric’.
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One may argue that with our questionnaires and the experiments we can only
indirectly assess the attractiveness of the different bankruptcy rules, because we
‘only’ judge the vicinity of a judgment or agreement to a proposed solution. To
gain direct evidence on the attractiveness of the normative rules, we investigate in
the last part of our study the bargaining problem with claims from a different view-
point. In a further survey study we confronted respondents with the description
of the rules and asked them to rank the proposed rules according to their per-
ceived attractiveness. Thus, in this ‘beauty contest’ of rules subjects can explicitly
compare the rules. Again, we find that the proportional rule receives the strongest
support.
To our knowledge this study is the first to combine questionnaires, experiments
and different claim points in one design. The only other experiments that explicitly
investigate bargaining with claims problems we are aware of are Klemisch-Ahlert
(1996), Herrero et al. (2004) and Gächter and Riedl (2005). Klemisch-Ahlert (1996)
is interested in the evaluation of distributive principles subjects apply in bargaining
environments. Specifically, she investigates how the subjects’ distributive princi-
ples depend on their bargaining position and how the subjects’ principles and
the bargaining environment influence the agreements. Gächter and Riedl (2005)
use a bargaining with claims framework to investigate the role of entitlements in
the negotiation process. The paper closest to ours is Herrero et al. (2004). These
authors investigate the experimental performance of non-cooperative procedures
that underpin prominent bankruptcy rules and how different framings of the exper-
iment influence the outcomes.
Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section we formally introduce
the claims problem and the three prominent solutions investigated in our study.
Following Herrero and Villar (2001) we call them the three musketeers. Section 3
describes the details of our research design. Section 4 discusses the main results.
Section 5 introduces the ‘beauty contest of normative rules’ and the results of this
contest. Section 6 concludes.
2 The claims problem and the ‘three musketeers’
Informally, a claims problem is a distribution problem that involves the allocation
of a single (perfectly divisible) good, the estate, in a situation where the available
resource is not sufficient to meet all agents’ claims simultaneously. Such a problem
can be resolved by the application of a rule that prescribes how the resource should
be allocated among the claimants. The idea behind such a rule is that it does not
depend on particular circumstances of the situation where the problem occurs but
only on the economically relevant variables, that is the agents’ claims and the value
of the resource. For a given situation the rule processes the relevant circumstances
to a result, which is the solution of the problem for the given situation.
In the following we provide formal definitions of a claims problem and the
prominent rules for solving it. We follow the presentation of Thomson (2003) (see
also, e.g., Herrero and Villar 2001). Denote the net worth of the estate (good,
resource) by E . The set of agents is N , and each agent i ∈ N has a claim or
demand ci ≥ 0 on E ∈ R. The vector of claims is then denoted c = (ci )i∈N and
C = ∑i∈N ci .
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A claims problem is a pair (c, E) ∈ RN+ ×R+ with
∑
i∈N ci ≥ E . The class of
these problems is denoted by BN . A solution to the claims problem is a function F ,
a rule, defined on the class of claims problems that associates with each problem
in the class a division of the estate between the claimants. It has the following
properties: (1) 0 ≤ F(c, E) ≤ c, (2) ∑i∈N Fi (c, E) = E .
In this paper we investigate three prominent and classical solutions to the claims
problem: the constraint equal-losses rule, the proportional rule and the constraint
equal-awards rule which are the ‘three musketeers’, according to Herrero and Villar
(2001). These rules are of particular interest because they are the ones used most
often in practice. Furthermore, these rules have in common that they are the only
three rules that simultaneously satisfy an intuitively reasonable set of axioms.
These are the axioms of equal treatment of equals, scale invariance, composition,
path-independence and consistency (see Moulin 2000; Herrero and Villar 2001).
The constraint equal-losses (CEL) rule distributes the estate such that all agents
suffer the same losses, subject to the condition that no claimant ends up with a neg-
ative reward. Formally, for all (c, E) ∈ BN and all i ∈ N there exists a λ > 0 such
that CELi (c, E) = max{0, ci − λ}. By the definition of a rule it follows that λ is
such that
∑
i∈N max{0, ci − λ} = E .
The proportional (PROP) rule awards the estate in proportion to the claims.
That is, it equalizes the ratios between claims and awards. The formal definition is
as follows: For all (c, E) ∈ BN there exists a λ > 0 such that PROP(c, E) = λc.
By the definition of a rule it follows that E/C = λ ∈ ] 0, 1].
The constraint equal-awards (CEA) rule divides the estate equally between all
claimants with the proviso that no agent receives more than her claim. Formally,
for all (c, E) ∈ BN and all i ∈ N there exists a λ > 0 such that CEAi (c, E) =
min{ci , λ}. The definition of a rule implies that λ solves ∑i∈N min{ci , λ} = E .
Note that the idea of equality underlies each of the above rules. However, each
rule applies the idea of equality to different variables. CEL focuses on the equality
of losses, the PROP rule ensures the equality of ratios and the CEA rule puts its
emphasis on the equality of awards.
We also consider the simple equal division of the estate, an outcome often
observed in symmetric bargaining experiments (e.g., Nydegger and Owen 1975),
as a fourth possible rule and benchmark:
The equal-awards (EQUA) rule just divides the estate equally between all
agents. That is, for all (c, E) ∈ BN , EQUA(c, E) = (E/n, . . . , E/n).
In our experiments and vignettes (for details see the next section) we investigate
two-person bargaining problems with claims where the pie to be distributed is 2050
‘points’. We consider two different claims points, (1980, 510) and (1640, 850),
which both sum to 2490.
Figure 1 graphically depicts our bargaining problems with claims and the solu-
tions discussed above for our parameters. In the figure we normalize the pie of
2050 to one.
3 The research design
Recall that we are interested in two dimensions of the empirical performance of
the four bankruptcy rules – the normative dimension and the behavioral dimension.
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Fig. 1 Graphical representation of the bargaining with claims problems and the solutions
We measure the normative dimension with the help of questionnaires that present
a vignette (‘a scenario’) to the respondent. We assess the behavioral dimension by
looking at actual negotiations of financially motivated bargainers in a bargaining
with claims environment. A second important feature of our design is the difference
in the asymmetry of the claims points. Since we are employing two research meth-
ods and investigate two claims points we have four treatments, which we summarize
in Table 1. We use the labels 1980E and 1640E for the experiments where the claims
points were (1980, 510) and (1640, 850), respectively, and the labels 1980V and
1640V for the vignette studies.
We start by describing the survey study and will then explain the experimental
setup and the procedures of our study.
3.1 The ‘bargaining with claims’ environments
The decision setup of both the vignette study as well as the experiments is a ‘bar-
gaining with claims’ environment as it is graphically described in Fig. 1.
Table 1 Our design
Method
Claims Treatment name (# of obs.)
(1980, 510) Experiment Vignette
1980E (N=28) 1980V (N=29)
(1640, 850) Experiment Vignette
1640E (N=12) 1640V (N=30)
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In the surveys subjects were given the following vignette (translated from Ger-
man), either with the claims (1980, 510), or (1640, 850):
Please imagine the following situation. You and your bargaining partner have to negoti-
ate over the division of a total budget of 2,490 money units. Historically, the total budget
has always been split according to performance. The bargaining partner who has shown
the better performance, has so far received an amount of 1,980 [1,640] money units
and the bargaining partner with the lower performance has received 510 [850] money
units. Take it for granted that the performance (i.e., who has shown the higher or lower
performance) can be objectively determined. It now turns out that the hitherto valid
claims cannot be satisfied anymore. The new total budget amounts now to 2,050 money
units (i.e., is 440 money units lower than the old budget). According to your opinion,
what would be a ‘fair’ new division from the vantage point of a non-involved, neutral
arbitrator? (Please give exact amounts and no intervals! The amounts have to add up to
2,050 money units) [emphasis in original].
Your opinion on the division of the arbitrator:
Amount for the bargaining partner with the better performance: ..........
Amount for the bargaining partner with the lower performance: ..........
2050.
The experiment used the same decision problem as in the survey studies. How-
ever, while in the vignette the claims point can just be given as part of the description
of the problem, in the experiment this might by considered as cheap talk and is
therefore not a useful thing to do. In our experiment, therefore, subjects first earn
the claims in a competitive task. With a certain probability these claims are actually
paid out to the subjects. With the remaining probability subjects are told that the
claims are infeasible and that they have to negotiate an agreement in a symmetric
free-form bargaining. In case they fail to reach an agreement, they earn nothing.
We will now describe the experiment in more detail.
The experiments were conducted as follows.3 At the beginning of the experi-
ment, subjects were randomly allocated to computer booths, which were located
in two different rooms. After subjects had finished reading the instructions the first
part of the experiment started, in which subjects earned claims in a general knowl-
edge quiz. In particular, subjects had to answer 24 questions from a variety of fields,
including astronomy, history, sports, music, politics, etc. We were very careful to
select questions that students with a high school degree should in principle be able
to answer, and that subjects would recognize as testing their high school knowl-
edge. The knowledge quiz was a multiple choice test with five possible choices
and only one correct answer. All subjects had to answer the same questions. They
had 12 min to answer all questions. Unanswered questions were counted as wrong
answers.
After the quiz we told the subjects which of the two bargaining partners did
better in the knowledge quiz. We only informed them about the rank of their per-
formance (i.e., whether they did better or worse than their bargaining partner) and
not about the actual number of correct answers. Apart from simplicity reasons,
we wanted to hold the claims constant across subjects and between bargaining
pairs.
3 The experimental instructions can be downloaded from http://www.fee.uva.nl/creed/pdffiles/
instr2bankruptcy.pdf.
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A chance move then determined whether the budget shrunk to 2,050 points or
remained at 2,490 points.4 The former implied that subjects had to negotiate over
the division of the smaller pie of 2,050 points. If the latter outcome occurred the
claims according to the knowledge quiz were actually paid out.5 By making the
claims a potential payment in the experiment, we gave the subjects an incentive to
see the knowledge quiz as an important part of the experiment. Moreover, previous
research shows that a knowledge quiz is indeed viewed as representative of true
desert (e.g., Hoffman et al. 1994; Clark 1998; Ball et al. 2001). Thus, given the
previous evidence on the effectiveness of non-paid knowledge quizzes and given
that in our case the claims could actually be paid out, we believe that our procedure
is an effective way to implement the claims.
To examine whether the claims affect bargaining behavior at all we conducted
a control experiment without claims. This experiment was set up in exactly the
same way as the one just described, except that there was no knowledge quiz and
no claims to be earned. Twenty-four subjects participated in this experiment.
The bargaining was free-form, i.e., there was no fixed bargaining protocol (see,
e.g., Roth and Murnighan 1982). We implemented a free-form bargaining protocol
because (1) it is naturally occurring and (2) because the cooperative bargaining
theories do not specify a bargaining protocol. Bargaining was conducted over a
local area network with the help of the experimental software ‘Rabbit’ (Brandel
2000). The negotiators were allowed to make any (non-negative) proposal as long
as the sum of shares was smaller or equal to 2,050 points. The negotiators had
15 min to reach an agreement. The instructions told the subjects that in case they
fail to reach an agreement within the time limit they would earn nothing in this
experiment, except their show-up fee. Hence, the ‘threat point’ in this experiment
is (0, 0). Random pairing, anonymity, duration and disagreement payoffs were
common knowledge.
3.2 Procedures and payments
The vignettes where administered to 59 first year undergraduate students of law,
business administration and computer science of the University of Vienna who
were, at the end of class, asked to answer the above problem. Participation was
voluntary and anonymous.6 Each participant only took part either in 1980V or in
1640V. It took the students roughly 10 min to answer the question.
The experiments were conducted in the computerized lab of the Institute for
Advanced Studies in Vienna. The 80 experimental subjects had the same back-
4 In the experiment the chance move was implemented as follows. After subjects were informed
about the rank of their performance, each bargaining partner in a dyad had to roll a six-sided die.
It was explained that the claims would be actually paid out if the sum of the numbers of both dice
was greater or equal to 11. If the sum of the dice numbers was smaller than 11, the bargaining
partners had to bargain over how to split the smaller pie of 2,050 points.
5 In case the dice determined that the claims will be paid out, we told the pairs to bargain
hypothetically over the sharing of 2,050 points. We ensured the subjects that they will receive
their claims regardless of the outcome in the hypothetical bargaining. This procedure ensured
that no bargaining pair left earlier than the others, which would have been technically difficult
and disturbed the experiment. We only observed three pairs that had to bargain hypothetically.
6 To avoid any experimenter demand effect we did not administer this questionnaire to our own
students but instead asked colleagues to administer the questionnaire for us in their class.
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ground as our survey participants. Nobody who participated in the vignette study
took part in the experiments. Moreover, each subject only participated in one exper-
iment. The experimental subjects were paid according to their decisions in the
experiment. The average earning (including a show-up fee) was approximately
Euro 19. On average, an experiment lasted 75 min, including reading the instruc-
tions, performing the experiment and answering a post-experimental questionnaire.
4 Results
We first analyze the normative judgments and then describe the results of the nego-
tiations. We start our analysis at an aggregate level. In a further important step we
will evaluate the predictive power of the four solutions by performing an individ-
ual-level analysis.
For convenience, in the remainder of the paper we refer to the subject with the
high claim (either 1,980 or 1,640) as the ‘winner’ and to the subject with the low
claim (either 510 or 850) as the ‘loser’ of the performance quiz. Moreover, we will
adopt the convention to express all allocations in ‘winner shares’, i.e., the share of
the total pie of 2,050 that goes to the ‘winner’ of the quiz, i.e. the better performer.
4.1 Normative judgments
What are the normative views our respondents hold about the fair division in the
two bargaining with claims environments? Our first result records the evidence.
Result 1 The claims strongly affect the normative views of a fair division. If claims
are 1,640, the average winner share is 65.2%, which is closest to PROP. If claims
are 1,980, the respondents on average think the winner should get 75.4%. This
comes closest to CEA. Fairness judgments also become more heterogeneous when
claims are very asymmetric.
Support Figure 2 provides a graphical support for our first result. It shows a box-
plot for each of the two claim levels.7 The medians of the two distributions are
far apart from each other. With the 1,980 claims the whole distribution is shifted
upwards. Both a non-parametric Mann–Whitney test and a Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test show that the null hypothesis of equal distributions can be rejected at all con-
ventional levels. In the impartial judgments of the vignettes, the answer in 1980V
is on average 10.2 percentage points higher than in 1640V. A further interesting
observation is that the variance is considerably higher in 1980V than in 1640V.
The standard deviation when claims are strongly asymmetric is 9.7%, while it is
6.5% in 1640V. A variance ratio test rejects equality of variances of the fairness
judgments in the two claims conditions (F test, p = 0.0351). Thus, the asymmetry
of claims increases the heterogeneity in fairness judgments.
7 The box-plot is a convenient compact way of describing the distribution of outcomes. The
rectangle contains 50% of the observations. The lower end of the rectangle is the 25th percentile
and the upper end the 75th percentile. The horizontal line in the box indicates the median. The
vertical line outside the box indicates the adjacent values, and the dots outside the adjacent lines
are ‘outliers’. The distribution of all normative judgments can be found in the Appendix.


























Fig. 2 Box-plots of distribution of normative judgments
Table 2 Deviations from predicted solutions in normative judgment












∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05; t tests, two-sided
a Average difference of answer to the respective rule, positive if average answer is larger than
solution
We now look at which rule organizes the data best, i.e., which solution comes
closest to the observations on the aggregate level. Table 2 summarizes for both
claim levels the mean deviation of the observed outcome from a particular theo-
retical solution. For instance, with claims of (1980, 510) CEL proposes that the
winner should get a share of 0.859 of the new pie of 2,050. The answers from the
survey fall short of the CEL prediction by an average of −0.104 and this difference
is significant according to a two-tailed t test.
In 1640V answers come closest to PROP (which predicts a share of 65.9%),
whereas in the highly asymmetric claims of 1980V the answers are very close to
CEA, which predicts 75.1%. Note this implies that the normative attractiveness of
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the different rules is not constant across claims. Finally, the equal split EQUA is
farthest apart from the observed answers. This holds for both claim points.
Experimental evidence and theories of prominent numbers (see, e.g., Albers
and Albers 1983) suggest that subjects do not always calculate ratios and shares
exactly but rather approximate them by rounding to the next prominent number(s).
What the relevant prominent numbers are (that is, the prominence level ) depends
on the design of the decision situation and the generated data set. Selten (1987)
describes a method for the determination of the prominence level of a data set. We
applied that method to the winner shares (in points) of the normative judgments
and find that the prominence level in our vignette is given by  = 50. A related
issue concerns the calculation of the claim ratios, which are no integer numbers
(1640/850 = 1.9294 and 1980/510 = 3.8882). Here we assume that our respon-
dents round the ratios to 2 : 1 and 4 : 1, respectively.
We shortly discuss how our previous results with respect to PROP change when
taking the prominence structure of our vignette into account. We denote the lower
bound of the proportional rule for  = 50 by PROPp50l and the corresponding
upper bound by PROPp50u . In 1640V any winner shares between PROP
p50
l = 0.659
and PROPp50u = 0.683 (1,350 and 1,400 in points) are then consistent with PROP.
For 1980V the PROP-consistent winner shares are between PROPp50l = 0.780 and
PROPp50u = 0.805 (1,600 and 1,650 in points). In 1640V we find that actual norma-
tive judgments do statistically significantly differ from the upper bound PROPp50u
(p = 0.0140; t test, two-sided) but not from the lower bound PROPp50u (p =
0.5867; t test, two-sided). Similarly, for 1980V we also find that actual judgments
are statistically significantly different from PROPp50u (p = 0.0089; t test, two-
sided) but not from the lower bound PROPp50l (p = 0.1569; t test, two-sided).
Only the last result differs from the results reported in Table 2. There we found that
actual normative judgments are statistically significantly below the point prediction
PROP. A similar analysis with respect to the other rules does not change the results
depicted in Table 2. Hence, when taking the prominence level of the data set into
account the observed normative judgments can be viewed as consistent with the
proportional rule as well as with CEA.
4.2 Negotiated agreements
While the vignettes elicit the impartial normative views, in actual negotiations
many other motives, in addition to the normative views can play a role and influence
the agreements. Result 2 summarizes our main observations from the bargaining
experiment.8
Result 2 The bargaining agreements are affected by the claims but not by the
difference in the asymmetry of the claims. In 1980E, the average winner share is
58.5%, which comes closest to EQUA. In 1640E the winner share is 57.3%. This
8 Our main interest is on the reached agreements. Most of the agreements were reached clearly
before the deadline of 900 s. Out of the 31 agreements 5 were reached in the last 5 s, which
indicates a weak deadline effect also observed in earlier free-form bargaining experiments (e.g.,
Roth et al. 1988). In nine cases no agreement was reached.


























Fig. 3 Box-plots of distribution of negotiated agreements
is closest to CEA. The variance in agreements strongly increases in the asymmetry
of claims.
Support Figure 3 depicts the distribution of agreements for the two claim levels.
(The distribution of all bargaining outcomes can be found in the Appendix.) Recall
that we also conducted a control experiment without claims to examine whether
asymmetric claims matter at all. In line with previous symmetric free-form bar-
gaining experiments (e.g., Nydegger and Owen 1975) we find that 100% of the
agreements implement the equal split. Thus as Fig. 3 shows, the presence of asym-
metric claims strongly affects the bargaining outcomes. Two further observations
are noteworthy. First, the variance in the agreed winner shares is considerably
higher in 1980E than in 1640E. In 1980E the standard deviation is 11.5%, which
is twice as high than in 1640E, where it is 5.7%. A variance ratio test clearly
rejects equality of variances of the agreements in the two claims conditions (F
test, p = 0.0253). Thus, the more asymmetric claims are the more heterogeneous
agreements become. Second, the mean agreements are very similar. In 1980E the
agreed winner share is 58.5%, while it is 57.3% in 1640E. Both a non-parametric
Mann–Whitney test and a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test show that the null hypothesis
of equal distributions cannot be rejected (p values are 0.825 and 0.389).
When we look at which solution comes closest to the observed average agree-
ments we find that in 1980E EQUA predicts best, whereas in 1640E CEA does
best. However, we observe also that actual winner shares are significantly above
the share of one half. Table 3 records the details.
We close this section by comparing the normative judgments and actual agree-
ments. First, a Kruskal–Wallis test shows that the null hypothesis of equal dis-
tributions in all of our four treatments can be rejected at any conventional level
(p = 0.0001). Second, a comparison of normative judgments and actual agree-
ments for the 1,640-claim (i.e., 1640V and 1640E) shows that the actual agree-
ments are 7.9% lower than the normative judgments. This difference is significant
according to a two-sided Mann–Whitney test (p = 0.001). When claims are very
asymmetric (i.e., in 1980E and 1980V), the gap between actual agreements and
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∗∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗ p < 0.05; t tests, two-sided
a Average difference of answer to the respective rule, positive if average answer is larger than
solution
b The number of observations is less than the number of bargaining pairs due to three disagree-
ments in 1640E and six disagreements in 1980E
normative judgments amounts to 17 percentage points, which is significant at any
level. Thus, the asymmetry in claims also increases the divergence of actual agree-
ments and normative judgments.
4.3 Which rule predicts best? An individual-level analysis
In this section we systematically examine the relationship between proposed solu-
tions and observed outcomes. For doing so, we look at individual-level data to
avoid potential averaging effects that might be present in the analyses of Tables 2
and 3. We proceed as follows. We calculate for each subject in the surveys (each
bargaining pair in the experiments) the absolute differences of his or her answer
(reached agreements) from the four solutions. We then rank the solutions accord-
ing to the smallest difference of actual and proposed division. For instance, if a
subject’s answer comes closest to CEA, and is farthest apart from EQUA, CEA is
ranked first and EQUA is ranked fourth for this subject. Finally, we calculate, for
each treatment, the average rank of each solution. This provides us with a measure
for the relative attractiveness of the different solutions at an individual level. We
summarize this analysis in the following result.
Result 3 (a) In the normative judgments PROP comes closest to the observed
results. This holds for both claims points. (b) In the negotiations the agreements
are closest to CEA for both claims points.
Support Table 4 displays the distribution of ranks per treatment and per solution.
For instance, in 1980V, CEL is first-ranked for the answers of 4 subjects, second-
ranked for the answers of 2 subjects, third-ranked for the answers of 18 subjects
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Table 4 Ranking of solutions
Claims Normative judgments Actual negotiations
CEL PROP CEA EQUA CEL PROP CEA EQUA
(1980, 510)
1st rank 4a 14 7 4 0 2 5 15
2nd rank 2 11 16 0 1 5 16 1
3rd rank 18 4 6 1 5 15 1 0
4th rank 5 0 0 24 16 0 0 6
Mean rank 2.8 1.7 2.0 3.6 3.7 2.6 1.8 1.9
Ranking of rules Third First Second Fourth Fourth Third First Second
(1640, 850)
1st rank 6 18 4 2 0 2 4 3
2nd rank 14 9 6 1 1 3 4 1
3rd rank 5 3 20 2 2 4 1 2
4th rank 5 0 0 25 6 0 0 3
Mean rank 2.3 1.5 2.5 3.7 3.6 2.3 1.7 2.6
Ranking of rules Second First Third Fourth Fourth Second First Third
χ2 testb: p values 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.57 0.41 0.42 0.20 0.12
a Numbers indicate the number of observations for which the result (i.e., answer in vignette or
agreement in bargaining) is closest, second closest, third closest and fourth closest, respectively,
to the respective rule
bχ2 tests compare the distribution of ranks between the different claims for each rule
and fourth-ranked for the answers of 5 subjects. Table 4 also reports the mean ranks
and the overall ranks for the solutions, based on the mean ranks.
Table 4 clearly shows that in the normative judgments of the vignette treat-
ments, PROP is the first ranked solution and EQUA receives the fourth rank. This
holds for both claims points. In the negotiation experiments quite a different picture
emerges. Here we find for both claims points that CEA is the solution than comes
closest to the reached agreements and thus receives the first rank.
We know from Result 1 that on average the normative attractiveness of a solu-
tion is not independent of the asymmetry of the claims points. Here the question
arises, whether there is a similar phenomenon with respect to the rank of the solu-
tions. That is, does the rank of a solution implied by a particular rule depend on the
asymmetry of claims? This is an important question because the normative rules
are independent of the asymmetry in claims. Here we can report the following
finding.
Result 4 (a) In the experiments, the distribution of ranks is not significantly differ-
ent between 1980E and 1640E. This holds for all four solutions. (b) In the normative
judgments, however, we find significant differences between 1980V and 1640V in
the distribution of ranks for CEL and CEA. PROP and EQUA are not significantly
differently ranked. This indicates that in the vignettes the preferred rule is not
independent of the claims.
Support In Table 4 we report pairwise χ2 tests of the distribution of rank orders
for each of our solutions and per method of investigation. The results show that in
the experiments the distribution of ranks does not differ between claim levels in
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all four rules (p ≥ 0.12). By contrast, in the normative judgments of the vignette
studies, only the ranks of PROP and EQUA are equally distributed between claims.
CEL and CEA are not stable since the distribution of ranks is significantly affected
by the claims points.
At first sight Result 4 seems puzzling. We propose the following interpretation.
Let us concentrate on the normative judgments first. Here we find that between
claims, only CEL and CEA change ranks; PROP and EQUA are ranked equally
across claims. Recall that CEL implements the most unequal division of the surplus
of all four rules, whereas CEA is the most equal ‘musketeer’ (apart from EQUA,
of course). When claims are very asymmetric, as in 1980V, people find the more
equalizing CEA more attractive than the unequal CEL, whereas if claims are more
equal, as in 1640V, people appreciate CEL more than CEA. In the experiment CEA
is ranked first, whereas CEL is ranked last in both claims conditions. However, in
the experiments we find that PROP and EQUA change ranks across claims (though
the change in ranks is not statistically significant). When claims are very asym-
metric (in 1980E), EQUA is more attractive than PROP, whereas when claims are
moderately asymmetric (in 1640E), PROP is better ranked than EQUA. Thus, in
both the normative judgments and the actual negotiations, when claims are very
asymmetric, people prefer, ceteris paribus, the more egalitarian solutions, whereas
they appreciate the more unequal rules when claims are moderately asymmetric.
4.4 An alternative look at negotiated agreements
In our analysis of the negotiated agreements we focused on the three musketeers as
point predictions of bargaining outcomes in bankruptcy situations. Some authors
(e.g., Selten 1987; Uhlich 1990), however, argue that actual behavior in bargaining
and characteristic function games is better described by outcome areas instead
of points. Kuon and Uhlich (1993) examined behavior in two-person characteris-
tic function games by applying the Negotiation Agreement Area Theory (NAAT)
developed by Uhlich (1990). We will follow their approach and examine area solu-
tions of our bankruptcy games. In the course of the analysis we will adopt and
extend the original NAAT to games with claims and introduce a claims adjusted
NAAT.
The NAAT is based on the idea of aspiration levels players may form when
entering a bargaining situation. For two-person characteristic function games min-
imal aspiration levels are assumed to be the stand-alone values of the single ‘coali-
tion’. In our bankruptcy games these values are simply given by the disagreement
points. This implies that the minimal aspiration levels are given by Amini := di =
0, i = l, w, where l (w) stands for loser (winner). The maximal aspiration level
of a player is assumed to be given by her marginal contribution to the grand coa-
lition. In our bankruptcy games the value of the grand coalition is the estate E
and the stand-alone values are zero. Thus, when directly applying the definition
of the maximal aspiration level we get Amaxi := E . However, bankruptcy games
differ from usual bargaining situations by the existence of claims points. There-
fore, it seems reasonable to adjust the maximal aspiration levels such that they are
equal to the claims. The rationale for this adjustment is that in a bankruptcy situ-
ation no claimant can reasonably ask for more than her claims, since no impartial
judge would allocate more than the claims to a claimant. We define, therefore, the
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claim adjusted maximal aspiration levels as Acamaxi := ci , i = l, w. A third kind
of aspiration level defined in NAAT is the attainable aspiration level, which is –
for symmetric games – given by the maximum of the stand-alone value and the
equal split of the grand coalition value. In our symmetric bankruptcy situations this
reduces to Aatti := E/2, i = l, w.
In the original NAAT for two-person characteristic function games it is argued
that the stronger player (that is, the player with the higher stand-alone value in
asymmetric games) has an advantage, because in case of disagreement she has less
to lose. This argument is used to rationalize that the lower bounds of the NAA are
calculated differently for the two players. In our bankruptcy games this argument
has no bite since players are symmetric with respect to the disagreement payoff di .
Hence, both players are treated as equally strong. Using the original definitions for






= EQUAi , i = l, w,





cw + cl E = PROPi , i = l, w,
for the claim adjusted maximal aspiration levels. (The superscript s indicates that
these are bounds for a symmetric situation.) Hence, the NAAT reduces to a point
solution and predicts the equal split in the unadjusted case and the proportional
split in our claims adjusted approach.
Although, these solutions seem perfectly sensible one could argue that – despite
of the equality of disagreement points – claimants differ in their bargaining powers
because of their different claims. The player with the higher claim has more to
lose in case of disagreement, what may make him more carefully in the bargaining
process. Analogously to the arguments put forward in the original NAAT the ‘win-
ner’ in our games can therefore be viewed as the weaker player. This leads to new
lower bounds for the NAAT for that player. Formally, in the original unadjusted
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Table 5 Predictions of area solutions with and without prominence level adjustment
Predictions without prominence level adjustment
1640E 1980E
w_points w_share w_points w_share
EQUA 1025 0.500 1025 0.500
CEA 1200 0.585 1540 0.751
PROP 1350 0.659 1630 0.795
CEL 1420 0.693 1760 0.859
sNAA 1025 0.500 1025 0.500
sNAAca 1350 0.659 1630 0.795
asNAA [350, 1025] [0.333, 0.500] [660, 1025] [0.333, 0.500]
asNAAca [1121, 1350] [0.5467, 0.659] [1369, 1630] [0.668, 0.795]
Predictions adjusted for prominence level  = 25
1640E 1980E
w_points w_share Pred. success w_points w_share Pred. success
EQUA 1025 0.500 0.1106 1025 0.500 0.4086
CEA 1200 0.585 0.2217 [1525, 1550] [0.744, 0.756] 0.0328
PROP 1350 0.659 0.1106 [1625, 1650] [0.793, 0.805] 0.0328
CEL [1400, 1425] [0.683, 0.695] −0.0127 [1750, 1775] [0.854, 0.866] −0.0127
sNAA 1025 0.500 0.1106 1025 0.500 0.4086
sNAAca 1350 0.659 0.1106 [1625, 1650] [0.793, 0.805] 0.0328
asNAA [350, 1025] [0.171, 0.500] −0.1074 [650, 1025] [0.317, 0.500] 0.2712






cw + cl E = PROPl,
for the winner and the loser, respectively.9
In the upper part of Table 5 we summarize the area solutions discussed above
and calculate the predictions for our particular bankruptcy situations. For conve-
nience the predictions of the three musketeers and the equal split are also shown
in the table. The lower part of Table 5 depicts the predicted areas of the solutions
shown in the upper part after adjustment for the prominence level of our data set,
which is  = 25.10 For the calculation of the predictive success of a solution we
use the success measure developed by Selten and Krischker (1983) and formally
described by Selten (1991). This measure is defined as the difference between the
relative frequency of correct predictions (hit rate) and the size of the predicted sub-
set relative to the set of all possible outcomes. For instance, the predictive success
of EQUA in 1640E is given by 1/9–1/2051 = 0.1106. (There was exactly one
9 We have also considered the alternative where it is assumed that the claimant with the lower
claim is the weaker player. For the unadjusted approach this leads to lower bounds for the NAA
of E/2 for the winner and E/3 for the loser. For the claims adjusted case the NAA is empty
whenever cl < E/2, however. Since this holds for both of our bankruptcy situations we do not
consider this case further. It is nevertheless interesting to note that if cl ≥ E/2 then the winner’s
lower bound of the NAA is given by her proportional share. The lower bound for the loser is
[E/(2cw + E)]E .
10 Interestingly, the prominence level of the negotiated agreements is different from the one of
the normative judgments (see Sect. 4.1). A look at the data reveals that this is most likely due to
the much higher frequency of equal splits in the negotiations.
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agreement – out of nine in total – giving the winner 1,025 points, the number of all
possible winner shares in points is 2,051, and since EQUA is a point prediction the
absolute area of prediction is 1.) Similarly, the predictive success of, e.g., asNAAca
in 1980E is given by 7/22 − 301/2051 = 0.1742. In the lower part of Table 5 this
measure of predictive success is shown for the various solutions. We summarize
the main findings in our next result.
Result 5 A comparison of success measures for prominence adjusted area solu-
tions shows that in 1640E the asymmetric claims adjusted NAA predicts best,
whereas in 1980E the point prediction EQUA, which coincides with the symmet-
ric unadjusted NAA, has the highest predictive success.
5 A ‘beauty contest’ of musketeers
So far, our empirical strategy was to investigate which solution comes closest to
the normative judgments, or negotiated agreements, by subjects who did not know
explicitly about the solutions to claims problems. Thus, subjects could not for them-
selves evaluate the normative appeal of the various rules. To gain further insights
into the perceived attractiveness of the four ‘musketeers’ and to complement our
preceding evaluation of rules by direct evidence, we conducted a new survey study
with another 59 subjects. These subjects had the same background as the other
participants in our study. They had taken part neither in the experiments, nor the
vignette studies.
We had the same treatments (i.e., claims points) as above, which we label
1980BC and 1640BC (‘BC’ stands for the ‘beauty contest’ described below). We
gave the respondents the same description of the bargaining problem as in our
previous vignette study. However, instead of asking them about their opinion how
an arbitrator would solve the bankruptcy problem, we described the four rules to
them and asked them to rank the rules according to their perceived attractiveness
(‘the beauty contest’). After the subjects read the same scenario as documented
above, they were told the following (translated from German):11
Before the determination of the objective performance difference is finished (i.e., you
cannot yet know whether you have the objectively higher or lower performance), you
receive several proposals according to which fixed rule the new division of the budget
shall be regulated in the future. It is foreseeable that the budget will change often:
EL: ‘Equal Loss’. The reduction of the budget will be equally shared between the bar-
gaining partners and deducted from their hitherto valid claims. In the above situation
this rule would mean the following: The reduction of the budget amounts to 440 money
units. This reduction will be borne equally by both, i.e., deducted from the hitherto valid
claims. For the bargaining partner with the higher claim this rule would mean that his
share now is 1,640 − 220 = 1,420. The bargaining partner with the lower claim would,
according to this rule, earn 850 − 220 = 630 money units.
P: ‘Proportional Division’. The new division is proportional to the hitherto valid divi-
sion. In the above situation this rule would mean the following: According to the hitherto
valid claims the budget would be divided in the proportion of the claims in the old budget
(i.e., in the proportions 1640/2490 and 850/2490 resp.). With the new budget this rule
would lead to an amount of 1350 [1630] money units for the higher claim and to 700 [420]
money units for the lower claim [2050 × (1640/2490) = 1350; 2050 × (850/2490) =
700].
11 Here we document the description of rules for 1640BC. In the 1980BC questionnaire, param-
eters were adapted accordingly.
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E: ‘Equal Split’. The new budget will be split in equal parts. In the above situation
this rule would mean the following: Both bargaining partners receive the same amount:
2050/2 = 1025.
N: ‘No Loss for the Lower Claim’. The lower claim will not be cut. In the above situ-
ation this rule would mean the following: The bargaining partner with the lower claim
would also with the new budget earn 850 money units, i.e., his claim would not be cut.
The claim of the bargaining partner with the higher claim would therefore be cut by 440
money units, i.e., by the total reduction of the budget and would therefore amount to
1640 − 440 = 1200 money units.
The rules described for the subjects as ‘EL’, ‘P’, ‘E’, and ‘N’, correspond to
CEL, PROP, EQUA, and CEA, respectively. The subjects then received a decision
sheet on which they had to rank the four rules from first to fourth (i.e., from most
preferred to least preferred). Thus, our subjects in this vignette study were in the
same impartial situation as our subjects from the previous vignette study. However,
they now could compare and judge the rules, which lead to a particular solution
of the bankruptcy problem. This ‘beauty contest’ of rules yielded the following
result:
Result 6 When asked to rank the ‘musketeers’, subjects overwhelmingly rank
PROP first (and EQUA last) independent of the claims. When claims are very
unequal subjects rank more egalitarian solutions slightly better than when claims
are moderately unequal.
Support Table 6 depicts how often each rule was ranked first, second, etc. as well
as the mean rank for both treatments. In both treatments the proportional rule was
ranked first by most subjects. In 1980BC, PROP was ranked first in 19 out of 29
cases and in 1640BC it was ranked first even in 27 out of 31 cases. The average
rank was 1.5 and 1.2 in 1980BC and 1640BC, respectively. So there is no doubt
Table 6 A ‘beauty contest’ of rules
Treatment Solution
CEL PROP CEA EQUA
1980BC
1st rank 5a 19 3 2
2nd rank 7 7 11 4
3rd rank 12 2 7 8
4th rank 5 1 8 15
Mean rank 2.6 1.5 2.7 3.2
Ranking of rules Second First Third Fourth
1640BC
1st rank 4 27 0 0
2nd rank 17 2 8 4
3rd rank 7 1 15 8
4th rank 3 1 8 19
Mean rank 2.3 1.2 3.0 3.5
Ranking of rules Second First Third Fourth
χ2 testb: p values 0.11 0.22 0.10 0.49
a Numbers indicate the number of subjects who put the respective rule on the first, second, third
and fourth rank, respectively
bχ2 tests compare the distribution of ranks between the different claims for each rule
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that the proportional rule is the most attractive musketeer and EQUA is the least
attractive rule.
In the beauty contest the ranking of rules is stable across claims levels. None of
the pairwise comparisons for a given rule returns a significant difference, although
for CEL and CEA the p values are close to being marginally significant. That is, the
tendency is the same as in the vignettes and the experiments: in 1640BC, CEL is
considerably more attractive than CEA (mean ranks are 2.3 and 3.0, respectively);
whereas in 1980BC, CEL is only slightly better ranked than CEA.
6 Concluding discussion
In this paper we have taken an empirical approach to study bargaining problems
with claims. We see our paper as complementary to the axiomatic characterization
and game theoretic analyses that are prevalent in most of the literature. The results
from this literature are important because they make the normative and strategic
underpinnings of solution concepts transparent. However, for practical ends also
sound empirical knowledge about the predictive power and practical sustainability
of various derived rules is necessary.
We have argued that an empirical investigation of solution concepts involves
two dimensions: the normative views people hold and the actual negotiation behav-
ior when real money is at stake. To study the normative views we have developed
two separate survey studies that use a vignette technique. For studying negotiation
behavior we have designed a bargaining with claims experiment. To investigate the
robustness of the solution concepts we also varied the claims points. To our knowl-
edge no other study has combined these different research methods and variations
in claims points in the empirical investigation of bargaining problems with claims.
We find that the proportional rule (PROP) does very well in people’s normative
judgments. In particular, PROP is the clear ‘winner’ in a ‘beauty contest’ of differ-
ent rules. This holds irrespective of the asymmetry of claims. This might be not too
surprising, since the proportionality principle has a long tradition as a principle of
justice. It goes back to at least Aristotle: “Equals should be treated equally, and un-
equals, unequally in proportion to relevant similarities and differences” (see, e.g.,
Feldman 1999; E.E. Zajac, unpublished manuscript). This popularity of PROP is
also consistent with ‘equity theory’ (e.g., Selten 1978) or the ‘accountability princi-
ple (Konow 2000), which is related to equity theory. Equity theory argues with the
relative value of ‘inputs’ (performance in our case) and ‘outputs’ (claims). Since
the reduced pie does not affect this relative value, equity theory in this case predicts
the proportional solution. According to the accountability principle, entitlements
vary “in direct proportion to the value of the subject’s relevant discretionary vari-
ables, ignoring other variables, but does not hold a subject accountable for the
differences in the values of exogenous variables” (Konow 2000, p. 1075). In our
case the discretionary variables is the performance, and the exogenous variable the
pie reduction.
The appeal of CEL and CEA in the normative judgments depends to some
extent on the asymmetry of claims. When claims are very asymmetric, people tend
to prefer the ‘more egalitarian’ CEA rule whereas when claims are moderately
asymmetric people tend to prefer the – in terms of outcomes – more inequitable
CEL rule.
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We find a strong difference between the outcomes in actual negotiations and the
normative judgments. While claims strongly matter for the normative judgments
of how the surplus should be divided, actual negotiations moderate the effect of the
difference in asymmetries in claims considerably. Additionally, compared to the
normative judgments there is a strong level effect in so far that the actually agreed
outcomes are closer to the equal split than the normative judgments would indicate.
When looking at the point predictions of the three musketeers CEA predicts the
actual agreements best for both claim levels. For negotiated outcomes we also look
at area theories based on the Negotiation Agreement Area Theory taking also the
prominence level of our data set into account. In this case we find that an area
theory that is adjusted for the claims predicts best in case of the less asymmetric
claims, whereas for the more asymmetric claims the equal split seems to be a good
predictor.
How can we square the observation that PROP is the preferred rule in the nor-
mative judgments but more equal outcomes in the actual negotiations? We offer the
following explanation. The impartial normative judgments show that the propor-
tional solution is the most attractive focal point when there is no actual negotiation.
Yet, when negotiations actually have to take place, the claims are infeasible and,
hence materially irrelevant. Given the symmetric disagreement payoff of (0, 0),
the equal split becomes another focal point. Moreover, when viewing (the last few
seconds of) the free-form bargaining as a Nash demand game even every efficient
allocation of the surplus can be sustained by a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
Focal points are helpful in coordinating on one of the many equilibria. However,
in the negotiations there is a tension between several reasonable focal points. This
tension is the bigger the more asymmetric the claims are. This tension between the
asymmetric outcome provided by PROP and the symmetric outcome of the equal
split can explain why the variance in agreements is much larger in 1980E than in
1640E. Furthermore, the negotiation agreements indicate that outcomes between
EQUA and PROP are attractive compromises for many actual bargainers.
The difference between normative judgments and actual negotiation behav-
ior underscores the importance of studying both normative judgments and actual
behavior. In our view, learning about impartial normative views and actual behav-
ior when one is a stakeholder are complements, not substitutes. Learning about
normative judgments tells us about likely focal points in the negotiations. The fact
that we get different results in the experiment than in the normative judgments just
illustrates that being a stakeholder matters strongly. This makes perfect sense for the
following reasons. First, actual negotiations are strategic interactions with a threat
point, where the disagreement results in a zero payoff for both, which may make
the equal split another focal point. Second, in actual negotiations the opponents
do not necessarily hold the same normative views. As we have shown elsewhere
(Gächter and Riedl 2005), differences in normative attitudes indeed strongly shape
the whole negotiation process. Third, it is a well-known tendency of people to sub-
consciously mix their normative views with what benefits them. This ‘self-serving
bias’ can sometimes strongly influence negotiations (Babcock et al. 1995; Gächter
and Riedl 2005). Fourth, negotiators differ in their degree of selfishness, toughness
and willingness to compromise. Fifth, psychological research has shown that in
many decisions there is a ‘hot–cold’ empathy gap (Loewenstein 2000). Being in the
‘hot state’ of an actual negotiation is psychologically a different matter than making
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a normative judgment while being in an impartial ‘cold state’. All these factors can
already be observed in a well-controlled and ‘cool’ laboratory environment. It is
therefore very likely that they matter even more in outside-lab negotiations. The
flip-side of these observations is that the study of normative views really requires
impartiality.
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Fig. 4 Distribution of normative judgments and bargaining outcomes (in winner share)
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